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Live, Human-made Bacteria As Patentable
Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. 5 101: Diamond
v. Chakrabarty
For 200 years federal courts have generally interpreted
broadly Congress' power to grant patents.' However, because
patent law is of statutory origin: for an invention to be patentable it must fit into one of the four categories listed in 35 U.S.C.
section 101:3process,' machine," manufacture: or composition of
matter? The Supreme Court has held that these categories do
1. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.art. I, 5 8,
cl. 8.
In Kendal v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858) the Supreme Court stated
that "[tlhe true policy and ends of the patent laws . . . [contemplated and necessarily
implied] their extensions, and increasing adaptation to the uses of society." Later the
Court emphasized that courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature haid] not expressed." United States v. Dubilier Condensor
Corp., 289 U.S. 178,199 (1933). The very justification for the existence of the patent laws
was seen to lie in their ability "to serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
2. In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Markey, C.J., concurring).
3. Section 101 provides as follows: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
4. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law,
it is an art.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
5. "The term machine includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result."
Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853).
6. " 'Manufacture,' as well defined by the Century Dictionary, is 'the production of
articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.' " American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930).
7. "This phrase [composition of matter] covers all compositions of two or more substances and includes all composite articles, whether they be results of chemical union, or
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powers or solids." Shell Dev. Co.
v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,280 (D.D.C. 1957), afd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The
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not include certain "products of nature" such as mathematical
formulae, ideas, or laws of nature.' Nevertheless, Congress in
1930 enacted a bill stating that most asexually reproducing
plants are patentable even though they might be considered
products of nature.@The Supreme Court recently expanded the
area of live, patentable subject matter by holding in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty that "a live, human-made microorganism" is a
manufacture or a composition of matter and therefore patentable under 35 U.S.C. section 101.l0
Using a process of plasmid migration, Ananda Chakrabarty
produced a strain of bacteria capable of metabolizing the hydrocarbons that constitute crude oil.ll In 1972 he filed for a patent
on this invention." The patent application contained three
types of claims: (1)claims for the method of producing the bacteria, (2) claims for the bacteria mixed with a carrier material
The
such as straw and (3) claims for the bacteria themselve~.~~
patent examiner allowed the f i s t two types of claims but rejected the claims for the bacteria themselves on the ground that
these claims were "drawn to a thing occurring in nature that is
substantially unaltered and thus nonstatutory subject matter
[under 35 U.S.C. section 101]."14
Supreme Court adopted this definition in the instant case. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71,72 (1972)(mathematicalformula);
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)(ideas); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853)(electromagnetism).
9. Plant Patent Act, ch. 312,46 Stat. 376 (1930)(current version at 35 U.S.C. $8 161164 (1976)). Tuber-propagated plants, although asexually reproducing, were excluded
from patent protection. Id.
10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305, 310 (1980). The Court's use of the
term "human-made" may be confusing. Ananda Chakrabarty did not create life. He
merely inserted previously existing plasmids into certain existing bacteria to endow the
bacteria with the capability to degrade oil, an abiity they previously had not possess&.
A better term would be "genetically altered."
11. The four main hydrocarbons that constitute crude oil are n-octane, camphor,
salicylate, and naphthalene. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
12. The question of whether the bacteria were patentable did not affect the fact that
they were an invention: "It is time to settle the point that the terms invent, inventor,
[and] inventive . . . are unrelated to deciding whether the statutory requirements for
patentability . . . have been m e t There is always an invention; the issues is [sic] its
patentability." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962 (C.C.P.A. 1979)(emphasisin original).
13. Patent Application of Ananda M. Chakrabarty (June 7,1972), reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari app., a t 40-77, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
14. Letter from Patent EInminer to Ananda Chakrabarty (January 11, 1974), reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1%
The Court incorrectly said that the examiner also rejected the application on the
ground that living things were not patentable subject matter. 447 U.S. a t 306. See In re
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On appeal the Patent Office Board of Appeals (POBA) reversed the examiner's finding that the bacteria were an unaltered product of nature. Nevertheless, the POBA affirmed the
examiner's rejection of the claims for the bacteria themselves on
the ground that living things simply are not patentable subject
matter under section 101.15
At the next level of review, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the POBA's decision relying on
the authority of its holding in In re Bergy that in patent law
there is no significance to the fact that the subject matter sought
to be patented is alive.16 When the Supreme Court later remanded Bergy17 for further consideration in light of Parker v.
Flook,18 a case holding that an algorithm1@is unpatentable, the
CCPA vacated its earlier decision in Chakrabarty and recalled it
for the same reconsideration the court would give Bergy.'O After
reconsidering the cases and finding that Flook shed no light on
them, the CCPA afbmed its earlier decision to grant
Chakrabarty's patent claims." The Commissioner of Patents appealed to the Supreme Court?
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in the instant
case was whether "a live, human-made microorganism [was] patentable subject matter under [the patent ~ t a t u t e ] . "In
~ ~its opinion the Court noted that the broad constitutional power to grant
patents given to Congress was intended to foster "a positive effed on society through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy."u The Court reasoned that the meanings of manufacture and composition of
matter as used by Congress in the patent statute were expansive,
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 971 (C.C.P.A.
1979).
15. The POBA based its rejection on the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 that provides patent protection for most asexually reproducing plants. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 159a-64a
16. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d
40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
17. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978)(mem.).
18. 437 U.S. 584 (1977).
19. The Court defined an algorithm as a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem. Id. at 585 n.1.
20. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
21. Id. at 967, 987.
22. Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979)(mem.).
23. 447 U.S. at 305.
24. Id. at 307 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480
(1974)).
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especially in view of Congress' use in that statute of a comprehensive "any" to modify the terms." The Court found that this
interpretation was supported by the legislative history of the
1952 codification of the patent laws, which showed that Congress
intended the subject matter of section 101 to "include anything
under the sun that is made by man."26 The Court contrasted
Chakrabarty's altered bacteria with the newly discovered but
unaltered bacteria in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
CO.~'The Court found that in Chakrabarty no natural phenomenon had been claimed as in Funk, but a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter-a product of man having
a distinctive name, character, and use.a8
One of the Commissioner's main arguments against the patentability of microorganisms was based on the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. The 1930
Act explicitly stated that most asexually reproducing plants
were patentable, but did not mention bacteria? The 1970 Act
provided protection for new varieties of sexually reproducing
plants but specifically excluded bacteria?O It was argued that
the omission or exclusion of bacteria from these statutes indicated that Congress did not intend for bacteria to be patentable
in the absence of specific legislation. The Court, however, refused to view these acts as evidence that other living things not
25. 447 U.S. at 308. The Court cautioned, however, that such comprehensive language could not include certain phenomena or laws of nature. Id. at 309.
26. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (195l)(statement of P.J.
Federico); H.R. REP.NO. 1923, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 6; S. REP.NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5, reprinted in [I9521 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2394, 2399.
27. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). Mr. Bond patented a mixture of six strains of certain species of bacteria used to infect the roots of leguminous plants, thus enabling the plants to
take nitrogen from the air for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds. Unlike
other strains of these same species of bacteria, the new strains did not exhibit a mutually
inhibitive effect and were, therefore, more effective in infecting the plants. Id. at 129-30.
Therefore, the Court there found that the patentee had merely discovered "the
handiword of nature" and held that the patent was invalid. Id. at 131. Note, however,
that if living things were absolutely unpatentable there would have been no need for the
Funk Court to have made any distinction based on the properties of the bacteria
concerned.
28. 447 U.S. at 309-10.
29. Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930)(current version at 35 U.S.C. $9
161-164 (1976)).
30. 7 U.S.C. $5 2402-2583 (1976). "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproducing plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so re"
produced the variety, . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor .
Id. a t $ 2402(a).

.
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specifically included were automatically excluded from being
manufactures or compositions of matter, and, therefore, from
being patentable subject matter. The Court instead reasoned
that these acts merely refuted the long held assumptions that
plants could not adequately be described as required under then
existing law, and that patents could not be granted for plants,
even if they were new varieties, when they were reproduced by
operation of nature? The Court also rejected the idea that Congress had made any distinction between patentable and nonpatentable inventions based on the presence or absence of life and
emphasized that the true congressional intent merely recognized
a "relevant distinction . . between products of nature, whether
living or not, and human-made invention^."^^ The Court reasoned that the 1970 Act was enacted to extend patent protection
to sexually reproducing plants, all of which had been excluded
from patent protection by the 1930 Act because in 1930 such
new plant varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type? Since
Congress had given no explanation for the exclusion of bacteria

.

31. 447 U.S. at 311-12.
It may be doubted whether a valid patent can be granted for a plant even
if it is a new variety, when that plant is reproduced by operation of nature,
aided only by the act of the patentee in grafting it by the usual methods, and a
very serious question arises as to whether the definition given to the words
"invention" and "discovery" in the proviso in the bill, namely that they shall
be interpreted "in the sense of finding a thing already existing and reproducing
the same as well as in the sense of creating," does not go beyond the power
which the Constitution grants to Congress. Under the proviso the person who
is given the right to get a patent, if the found variety is new, has done nothing
whatever in any way toward creating that variety.
.

.

a

.

Further, and more important, there at once arises the difficulty of defining
in a written document . . . constituting part of the patent . . ., the differences
which identify a new variety from previously known varieties.
Plant Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, 7 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents).
The general patent law does not permit grant of a valid patent on a socalled "product of nature," since no inventive act can be presumed. Plants
found in an uncultivated state cannot be presumed to have been created by
other than nature.
Prior to the Plant Patent Act, this doctrine barred the patenting of plants.
Patent Law Revision: Hearing on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 2164, S. 2597 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, 790 (1968)(statement of Donald G. Daus).
32. 447 U.S. at 313.
33. Id. The Court is incorrect in saying that the 1970 Act extended patent protection to sexually reproducing plants. The 1970 Act was not a patent law. S. REP.NO. 911246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). The dissent made this same error. See 447 U.S. at
320 & n.5, 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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from the 1970 Act? the Court found no clear indication that
Congress had focused on the issue and therefore found no basis
for modifying the plain meaning of the words Congress used in
section 101.
The dissent rejected the majority's analysis of the legislative history of the plant acts and said that the Court should not
extend patent protection "further than Congress has provided."" Contending that Congress had felt it necessary to enact
specific legslation to create patent protection for plants, the dissent maintained that Congress could not have intended other
living things also to be patentable without further specific legislation. The dissent also argued that under the majority's analysis plants would have been patentable without the 1930 and
1970 Acts, which were therefore arguably superfluous legislation.
Noting that bacteria had been explicitly excluded from the
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 and reasoning that this
demonstrated Congress' intent that bacteria not be included
"within the scope of patent protection," the dissent found the
majority's interpretation of the plant acts unpersuasive. The dissent argued, "Congress, assuming that animate objects as to
which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented,
excluded bacteria from the set of patentable organism^."^^
Although the facts of the instant case warrant the Court's
particular holding that genetically altered bacteria are patentable subject matter, the Court unnecessarily failed to follow the
reasoning established in its prior decisions and thus made an unwarranted alteration in the definitions of what can be patented.
Chakrabarty presented the Court with a question of first impression-whether a live, genetically altered microorganism was
patentable under section 101 of the patent statute. This inquiry
actually presented two questions that should be considered separately. First, whether a genetically altered microorganism fits
the literal definition of any category of patentable subject matter under section 101. Second, if the altered microorganism does
fit the definition, whether it nevertheless is unpatentable be34. 447 U.S. at 313, 321. See H.R. REP.NO.91-1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7; S.
Sess. 7, reprinted in (19701 U.S. CODECONC.& AD.

REP.NO. 91-1138, 91st Cong., 2d
NEWS5082, 5088.

35. 447 US. at 319.
36. Id. at 321. Contrary to the dissent's statement, exclusion of bacteria from the
1970 Act did not exclude them from the "set of patentable organisms." The 1970 Act was
not a patent law. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
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cause it is alive. The Supreme Court's opinion addressed the
first but not the second queston. This Casenote will consider
both these questions in light of certain facts the Supreme Court
should have considered. The conclusion reached here is that
even though the Court's holding was correct, its reasoning would
have been more compelling if the Court had examined these
facts and followed its own precedents more closely.
The Court has previously given definitions to most of the
four categories of patentable subject matter. One of these four
categories is the "manufacture." Under the traditional definition, a manufacture is an article produced "for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or corn bin at ion^."^^ In addition, this transformation must be of a degree sufficient to give the invention "a
distinctive name, character or use from that of [the original
materials]."" In the instant case the Court quoted this traditional definition8@but did not directly apply it. Instead, the
Court reasoned that because Chakrabarty's discovery was "not
nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it [was] patentable
subject matter under 9 101" as a m a n u f a ~ t u r eThe
. ~ ~ definition
of manufacture, however, does not raise the issue of whether the
materials used are products of nature: "All of the tangible things
with which man deals and for which patent, protection is granted
are products of nature in the sense that nature provides the basic source materials.'"l Ore for metals, wood for lumber and silicates for glass are but three examples of natural products that
man transforms into patentable inventions. By focusing on
whether the bacteria were products of nature instead of whether
the materials were sufficiently transformed under the traditional
test for a manufacture, the Court unnecessarily departed from
its earlier decisions and made an unwarranted alteration in the
test for patentability.
Chakrabarty's microorganisms presumably would have been
held to be a manufacture under the traditional test. The raw
materials used to produce the microorganisms were four types of
plasmids and a strain of Pseudornonas aeruginosa, which is in37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
1958).

American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930).
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
447 U.S. at 308.
447 U.S. at 310. See note 50 infra.
Merck and Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir.
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capable of degrading hydrocarbons. Through genetic engineering
Chakrabarty was able to transfer the plasmids into the host bacteria.42By this process he produced bacteria, which previously
had no capability to degrade oil, with the capacity to degrade
four different hydrocarbons. This strain of new and different
bacteria had an increased usefulness as compared with the original, unmodified strain of naturally occurring bacteria. Therefore,
the new bacteria complied with the traditional definition of
manufacture.
In other words, the Court could have reached its desired result-allowing Chakrabarty's patent application-by merely following its previously established tests. Instead the Court chose
to reach that result by introducing a new test. In this sense the
Court's action can be labeled unnecessary. Furthermore, the introduction of the new Chakrabarty test raises questions about
the continued validity of some case law in the area of patents.
One example of such a question is illustrated in American
Fruit Growers, Inc. u. Brogdex Co.'" In this case, Brogdex Company patented a method for the preparation of oranges for market by impregnating the orange rinds with a solution of borax
sufficient to render them resistant to decay. American Fruit
Growers, Inc. challenged the validity of that patent. Reasoning
that borax-impregnated oranges were not found in nature, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the oranges could be
classified as manufactures and upheld the patent." Under the
test followed in Chakrabarty, a finding that the borax-impregnated oranges were not found in nature would have made them
patentable under section 101. However, on appeal the Supreme
Court held that this position was not tenable, adding that although a manufacture implied a change, not all changes are
manufa~tures;~~
something more is ne~essary.'~The Supreme
Court in American Fruit was following the reasoning of one of
its earlier cases, Hartranft v. Wiegmann," in which certain sea
42. Patent Application of Ananda M. Chakrabarty (June 7, 1972), reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari app., 40-77.
43. 35 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1929), rev'd, 283 U.S. 1 (1930).
44. Id. at 108. "The complete article is not found in nature and is thus an article of
manufacture." Id. Compare the Supreme Court's statement in the instant case that
Chakrabarty's "discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under $ 101." 447 U.S. at 310.
45. American Fruit Growers, Inc., v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930).
46. Id. at 12.
47. 121 U.S. 609 (1886).
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shells that had been cleaned by acid were held not to be manufactures for purposes of an import duty. In adapting the
Weigmann definition of a manufacture to patent law, the American Fruit Court stated that to constitute a manufacture
"[tlhere must be a transformation; a new and different article
must emerge 'having a distinctive name, character or use.' "48
Accordingly, the American Fruit Court held that a change in the
oranges sufficient to make them manufactures had not occurred.
They remained oranges "fit only for the same beneficial uses as
theret~fore."~~
However, the oranges would have been held to be
patentable under the Chakrabarty test because they were products of human ingenuity that had characteristics markedly different from those of oranges found in nature.'O
A second category of patentable subject matter is compositions of matter. Such compositions have been defined as the
mixture of two or more ingredients that may include "all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders
or solids.'"l In the instant case the Court adopted this definition, but, as with the definition of a manufacture, did not directly apply it. The Court instead determined that because the
bacteria were not products of nature they could be considered
combinations of matter? However, there was no need for the
Court to focus on the "product of nature" distinction in finding
the Chakrabarty bacteria to be compositions of matter. Under
the traditional definition, the bacteria were certainly compositions of matter. They were a composition of two substances, the
cell mass of the host bacteria and the four plasmids. The combi48. 283 U.S. at 13 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. at 615).
49. Id. at 12.
50. The test the Court applied in Chakrabarty is set forth in 447 U.S. at 310. Before
applying that test and holding that the bacteria were patentable, the Court quoted the
American Fruit- Wiegmann test: "respondent's micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown phenomenon, but to a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use.' " Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted).
However, the test the Court applied in Chakrabarty is set forth later in the opinion,
after this unsupported conclusion. After contrasting the bacteria in Chakrabarty with
those in Funk, the Court held that Chakrabarty had "produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential
for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own, accordingly
it is patentable subject mutter under 101." Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
51. 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,280 (D.D.C.
1957)).
52. 447 U.S. at 310.
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nation of the cell mass and the plasmids resulted in a composite
article. Thus, the traditional definition was met and the product
of nature analysis was unnecessary.
Even though an invention fits the literal definition of a
manufacture or a composition of matter, it is not automatically
entitled to patent protection. In Parker v. Flook," the Supreme
Court stated that an invention that was merely the discovery of
a law of nature could not be patented even if it met the other
patent req~irements.~
This rule excludes, for example, phenomena of nature, mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts." However, it is important to note that the unpatentability of a discovery of a law of nature does not preclude
the patentability of all products of nature. For example, naturally occurring chemical compounds have long been held to be
patentable.'0 Since bacteria are composed of naturally occurring
chemicals, it can be argued, bacteria should likewise be patentable. However, a major difference exists between naturally occurring chemicals and naturally occurring bacteria; the bacteria are
alive and the chemicals are not. For example, vitamin B-12 is a
naturally occurring chemical, but it is not alive." On the other
hand, the bacteria in Funk were products of nature that were
alive." Because the only difference between naturally occurring
chemicals and naturally occurring bacteria is the absence or
presence of life, the effect of life on patentability becomes an
important consideration.
53. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
54. Id. at 589.
The holding [in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.63 (1972)l that the discovery of
that method [of converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numerals] could not be patented as a "process" forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101 [footnote omitted]. Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical
formula is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law
of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.
Id.
"Inventions which are literally one of the four categories mentioned in 8 101 are not
patentable if they are also phenomena of nature because the public must not be deprived
of any rights that it theretofore freely enjoyed." Id. at 583 n.15.
55. Id. at 589.
56. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1958)(vitaminB-12); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)(adrenalin); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld
Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1910)(aspirin).
57. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir.
1958).
58. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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The Court addressed the issue of the effect of life on the
patentability of bacteria only in the context of the plant Acts.
The Court held that neither the 1930 nor 1970 plant Act resolved the issue of whether the Chakrabarty bacteria are unpatentable because they are alive. The persuasiveness of the
Court's opinion could have been strengthened, however, by noting several facts. First, the history of the Plant Patent Act of
1930 shows that Congress did not then consider whether living
things in general were patentable." Secondly, it was not even
the fact that plants were alive that caused Congress to believe
plants were not patentable under the existing patent statute.
Congress believed that because plants were products of nature
they could not be "inventions"; for the same reason it believed
their developers could not be "inventors" as defined in the patent statute." Congress accordingly determined that plants were
not patentable." To remove this obstacle Congress amended the
patent statutes. Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes was
amended to "avoid any doubt as to the scope of protection that
a patent of this kind would give the patentee . . . because the
word 'make' in the statute [was]usually understood to mean the
construction by human activity whereas plants [were] reproduced by growth."6a Section 4886, the core of the new legislation,
59. The legislative history of the 1930 plant Act contains only two references to patent protection for animals. Both are contained in short, offhand remarks, neither of
which was the center of discmion at the time it was made. "[Col. Francis W. Parker]
felt that some day the patent law would be amended so as to give the man who developed new forms of plant or animal life an opportunity to control reproduction." Plant
Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1930)(letter from Edward A. Rumeley). "This is establishing a precedent to provide for
a patent to those who develop a rare species of cattle or chickens." 72 CONG.REC.8,391
(1930) (remarks of Rep. Stafford). It is interesting to note that on April 1, 1969, an
application for a patent on a chicken was filed in the Patent Office. In re Merat, 519 F.2d
1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The patent examiner denied the application solely on the basis of
section 101. The POBA affirmed, adding that there was also a violation of section 112,
the description requirement. The CCPA m e d solely on the basis of section 112 saying
that the claims did "not particularly point out or distinctly claim the subject matter of
appellant's invention" as required by 35 U.S.C. 5 112 (1976). Id. at 1391, 1396 (emphasis
in original).
60. Plant Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents);
H.R. REP. NO. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1930).
61. Patent Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 2164, S. 2597 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, 790 (1968)(statement of Donald G. Daus).
62. Plunt Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents).
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explicitly provided for plant ~atents.~'Section 4888 was
amended to remove the difficulty of describing plants "in such
full, clear, concise and exact terms" as the patent law demanded." Congress also added a section authorizing the President to direct the Secretary of Agriculture to provide assistance
to the Commissioner of Patents to facilitate the administration
of the other provisions of the 1930 Act?
The Supreme Court also found that the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 did not preclude microorganisms from patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. section 101. However, the Court
failed to fully examine two important facts that would have
more strongly supported this finding: (1)the 1970 Act was not a
patent law, and ( 2 ) the 1970 Act protected only sexually reproducing plants.
The Court incorrectly stated that the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 extended patent protection to sexually reproducing plants.60 Although Congress contemplated extension of
patent protection to sexually reproducing plants, it never took
any action to enact such legislati~n.~~
Subsequently, Congress
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, which required the Department of Agriculture to issue "certificates of
protection" for sexually reproducing plants.08Thus, the 1970 Act
provided protection "along the lines of or similar to [the protection] under the patent law,"09 but it was not a patent law and it
did not "alter protection currently available within the patent
In addition, the 1970 Act was limited to sexually reproducing plants; fungi, bacteria and first generation hybrids were specifically excluded from its pr~tection.~'The Court postulated
that Congress had made this specific exclusion for one or more
of three possible reasons: (1)by 1970 artificial true-to-type reproduction of sexually reproducing plants was possible, (2) bacId. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 1, 2, 6, 7.
447 U.S. at 313. "By 1970, however, it was recognized . . . that patent protection
was . . . appropriate. The 1970 Act extended that protection." Id.
67. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
68. 7 U.S.C. $8 2402-588 (1976).
69. 116 CONG.REC.40,296 (1970)(remarks of Rep. Kleppe).
70. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
71. 7 U.S.C. 5 2402(a) (1976).
63.
64.
65.
66.
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teria were not considered plants by courts of lawT2or (3) the
However,
Patent Office had already issued patents on ba~teria.'~
the Court failed to note other facts that would have provided a
sounder basis for the Court's conclusion that the 1970 Act did
not affect the patentability of bacteria under the patent laws.
Congress did indicate that it excluded hybrids because they have
"built-in" prote~tion,'~ but did not indicate the reason for the
exclusion of fungi and bacteria from the 1970 Act.75The Court
viewed this omission as a mere failure by Congress to focus on
the particular issue before the Court. However, the Court failed
to note the simple fact that the reproductive process of bacteria
Therefore, bacteria would have been excluded from
is asex~al.?~
the 1970 Act because they do not reproduce sexually. Moreover,
the fact that bacteria are excluded from the 1970 Act-a nonpatent law designed to protect only sexually reproducing
plants-cannot bar the patentability of those bacteria under the
patent statute.
In addition to addressing the specific arguments advanced
before the Court against the patenting of living things based on
the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970, the Court should have addressed directly the basic,
underlying argument that living things should be unpatentable
because they are alive and that a patent on a living thing would
be a patent on life itself. The Court implicitly rejected this argument when it found that the Chakrabarty bacteria were patentable despite the fact that they were alive, but the Court's reasoning would have been clearer and more persuasive if it had
addressed the problem directly. For example, the opinion's per72. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
73. 447 U.S. at 314 & n.9. "Patents are granted on cultures [of bacteria]." S. REP.
No. 932, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959)(letter from Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of
Patents). The Patent Office also has a special classification for patents on bacteria. Class
435 is titled "Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology." The title of subclass 243
of class 435 is "Microorganisms Per Se, E.G., Protozoa, Etc." PATENT
OFFICE,CLASSIFICATION MANUAL
435-4 (1979).
74. A Bill to Provide Plant Variety Protection: Hearings Before the Patent Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. part 2, 643 (1968)(statement of Floyd Ingersoll).
75. H.R.REP.NO. 91-1605,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6,7; S. REP. NO. 91-1138, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS5082, 5088.
There is some evidence that Congress has viewed bacteria and fungi as nearly synonymous: "The term 'fungus' means any non-chlorophyll-bearing thallophyte . . . as for
example, . . . bacteria . . . . " 7 U.S.C. 3 136(k) (1976).
SCIENCE714 (2d ed. 1972).
76. W. KEETON,BIOLOGICAL
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suasive strength could have been increased by making an important but elusive distinction: life and living things are not synonymous. Life is the label affixed to the set of properties that are
unique to living things. Life is the "energy of function"77within
every living thing, the one component of a living thing that separates it from nonliving things." Life can also be said to be a
product of a nature.lS Since life is something man cannot manufacture, it is ~ n p a t e n t a b l eLife
. ~ ~ is, therefore, a unique, unpatentable component of all living things. It is a principle of patent
law, however, that "the invention set forth in a claim [must] be
construed as a whole."81 The idea that a claim can be dissected
and that a single unpatentable component of the claim can
cause the entire claim to become unpatentable has been specifically rejected." Thus, although the life component of a genetically altered microorganism is not itself patentable, its presence
in the microorganism cannot make the new microorganism as a
whole unpatentable.
Whether a live, genetically altered microorganism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. section 101 is one of the
most important decisions ever presented to a court. Unfortunately, rather than strengthening the traditional test for patentability to be applied to manufactures and compositions of matter, the Court's decision unnecessarily altered the traditional
test by focusing on a finding that the invention was not a product of nature. The Court could have strengthened and clarified
the test by applying the traditional definitions of the categories
of patentable subject matter more precisely and by examining
more closely the legislative history of the plant Acts and the
77. United States v. 24 Live Silver Black Foxes, 1F.2d 933,933 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
LIFE ON EARTH8 (1973).
78. E. WILLSON,
79. "[WJe have no direct evidence concerning the origin of life. We cannot be sure
how live did arise; we can only gather indirect evidence to show how it could have arisen
and how it probably arose." W. KEETON,supra note 76, a t 692.
80. Life is obviously not a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. It might
qualify as a process, "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result," if the materials are food, water and other essentials for maintaining life, and the
result produced is the living organism. However, the fatal argument against the patentability of life is that life is not new. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253
F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958).
81. I n re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.875
(1977).
82. Id. See also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 593-94 (1977); Makay Radio &
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S.
707, 729 (1880).
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possible effect life as a component of the invention could have
on patentability. Such an analysis would have made the Court's
reasoning more forceful and would have given its decision the
strong support of precedent and of the established principles of
patent law.
Brent J. Jensen

